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Introduction 
Logical linguistic representations have a high power of abstraction and many people 
think that they can model our reasoning abilities, partly because our knowledge 
expresses in linguistic terms, and also because our formal tools are built on 
alphanumerical representations. Nevertheless, inferential systems solely based on 
textual representations are very inefficient. Moreover, these systems raise difficulties at 
the representational level, because they require a complete specification of the concrete 
and abstract properties of the modeled objects. This is why computer scientists, used to 
think in terms of data structures, have early defended the use of diagrammatic 
representations, for instance in problem solving, on the basis of the fact that these 
representations were better adapted to specific domains (see [1] for an historical survey 
and critiques of logicist AI).  
Although commonly used in Science, for instance in Mathematics or Physics, 
diagrammatic representations have long suffered from their reputation as mere tools in 
the search for solutions. At the beginning of the 90's, Barwise and Etchemendy (B&E) 
have strongly denounced this general prejudice against diagrams ([2], [3], [4]). To cope 
with complex situations, they defended a general theory of valid inferences that is 
independent of the mode of representation, and these works lead on the first 
demonstration that diagrammatic systems can be sound and complete [5]. 
As far as human reasoning is concerned, there are many examples using non 
linguistic form of representation, and, to quote B&E, “human languages are infinitely 
richer and more subtle than the formal languages for which we have anything like a 
complete account of inference. [...]. As the computer gives us ever richer tools for 
representing information, we must begin to study the logical aspects of reasoning that 
uses nonlinguistic forms of representation” [2]. 
Following in B&E footsteps, our general project is to defend the interest of hybrid 
representation systems (HRS) – i.e. systems linking together several kinds of 
representations. We claimed in [6] and [7], that only HRS could yield to the building of 
models of reasoning, both computationally efficient and cognitively plausible.  
In this paper, we will first recall the most interesting characteristics of 
diagrammatic inferential systems, and add some comments about an example of human 
hybrid reasoning in a mastermind game. In the next section, we will give some 
arguments for the systematic study (and use) of HRS in AGI and cognition modeling, 
and some hints for their usefulness in program specification and semantics. 
1. Some characteristics of diagrammatic inferential systems 
In [2], B&E emphasized that the main properties of diagrammatic systems derive from 
the existence of a syntactical homomorphism between icons and represented objects. In 
many cases, this homomorphism yields to a very strong property called closure under 
constraints. In closed under constraints systems, the consequences of initials facts are 
included de facto in the representation and do not require extra computation. This 
makes these systems very efficient. As we have underlined in [6] and [7], this also 
shows a deep duality between two modes of reasoning.  
Linguistic (or traditional logical) reasoning requires: (1) the representation of 
initial properties of objects; (2) an explicit representation of abstract properties (or 
relations among objects); and (3) a computational mechanism linking the two sources 
of information (to establish the validity of a non-explicit consequence). Thus, by 
construction, such systems require calculations. For instance, if you know that Ann is 
on the left of Gaston on a bench, and that Gaston is on the left of Isabel, you need to 
add that the relation “be on the left of” is transitive to prove that Ann is on the left of 
Isabel.  
To the opposite, diagrammatic reasoning usually does not require the explicit 
representation of such abstract properties, because these properties are taken 
automatically into account by syntactic constraints on the representation itself. In our 
example, an iconic representation of the first fact will look like the (left) juxtaposition 
of two symbols (say, A for Ann and G for Gaston, as in: A G); and the second fact will 
yield to the juxtaposition of a third symbol (say, I for Isabel), as in:   A   G    I.  
Thus, you will just “see” on the resulting representation that A is on the left of I, 
without any computation. Since many consequences automatically appear on 
representations, diagrammatic systems provide an easy treatment of conjunctions and 
are computationally very efficient. Unfortunately, they have difficulties with 
disjunctive casesi. Alternatives may require the use of several diagrams, which must 
then be traversed one after the other, as in the linguistic case1. Note also that in many 
diagrammatic systems, each representation corresponds to a genuine situation, and that 
contradiction is impossible to represent (which can be good or bad depending on what 
you need to represent). 
Many researchers have tried (in the nineties) to analyze diagrammatic inferential 
systems properties and closure under constraints in particular. For Stenning and 
Oberlander (S&O) [9], diagrammatic representations seem mainly to differ from 
                                                           
1 The difficulty with disjunction reinforces the thesis that cognitive representations are mainly 
diagrammatical, because human performances are better in conjunctive than in disjunctive cases [8].  
linguistic ones by a more limited power of abstraction, but greater computational 
efficiency. They claimed that there are three classes of representational systems: the 
MARS (Minimal Abstraction Representational Systems), the LARS (Limited 
Abstraction Representational Systems) and the UARS (Unlimited Abstraction 
Representational Systems). They argue that this hierarchy of representational systems 
is analogous to that of languages isolated by Chomsky, and that most diagrammatic 
representation systems are LARS. A MARS is a system in which a representation 
corresponds to a unique model of the world under the considered interpretation. For 
instance in a mastermind game, a row of letters standing for a row of colored pawns, as 
[B B Y Y R], will be a minimal abstraction representation of a possible solution. 
However, you can easily augment the number of models captured in a MARS by 
introducing new symbols that allow abstracting on representations. For instance, in the 
mastermind example, you can have a “-” symbol standing for an undetermined color, 
as in [B B - Y R]. Such systems can quantify massively on possible models, but 
cannot specify arbitrarily complex dependences between the specified dimensions. This 
is why S&O called them LARS. They claimed that only linguistic symbols, added to a 
representation, could allow the description of arbitrarily fine dependences between 
dimensions. They defined a LARS as “a system that keeps its representations simple, 
and keeps assertions out of its keys” and claimed that most diagrammatic inferential 
systems are LARS. 
S&O identify the restricted capacity of diagrammatic systems with a property 
called “specificity”, which requires information of a certain kind to be explicit in all 
interpretable representation. In [10], Perry and Macken (P&M) have opposed to this 
strong notion of specificity (i.e. the mandatory specification of values of properties 
other than the one you try to represent) the notion of “determined character” due to 
Berkeley. Berkeley's notion of a determined character is that it is not possible to 
represent an object as having a certain property, without representing at the same time a 
specified value for this property. Thus, I cannot represent a triangle on a figure, without 
ending with a particular triangle. As well, it is not possible to represent a colored object 
on a drawing without specifying its color, but I can perfectly say, « this object has an 
interesting color », without specifying which oneii. For P&M, closed under constraints 
systems have, in addition to this determined character, a property called “localization” 
(already identified by Larkin and Simon in [12]). Localization is more important than 
specificity to characterize diagrammatic representations. Nevertheless, there are two 
properties of localization. The one identified by P&M is a purely logical property also 
called unique token constraint. It is the property of using only one token of a symbol to 
represent an object. This property disappears generally when you use a typed systemiii. 
Finally, P&M distinguish five kinds of representation going from text to images: 
graphic texts, charts, diagrams, maps and pictures. Their categorization uses two 
additional properties, iconicity and a constraint and systematic homomorphism 
(required to handle closure under constraints). 
As far as geometric or spatial aspects are concerned, Macken, Perry, and Hass 
emphasized the importance of iconicity in [13]. Iconicity allows representations with 
richly grounded meaning – that is meaning whose relation to form is not arbitrary. An 
iconic sign may have a readily inferable meaning (RIM), an easily remembered 
meaning (ERM), or an internally modifiable meaning (IMM). Road signs provide 
numerous examples of ERM, RIM and IMM (for instance, signposting bends). There 
also are many examples of symbols having a RIM in musical scores (as for instance, 
crescendo situated under the stave). However, iconicity is only partially analyzed until 
now, and IMM is still puzzling. We think that it could be sometimes linked to the 
syntactic homomorphism, because our personal conclusion is that the main distinction 
between linguistic (or symbolic) representation systems and analogical representation 
systems (as diagrammatic systems) must be characterized in terms of the power of the 
meta-language required to provide the semantics of the system. In the analogical case, 
the metalanguage needs to reference syntactical properties of the object language, while 
in the symbolic case, this is not obligatoryiv.  
2. Hybrid human reasoning in mastermind 
The preceding section recalls that iconic representations can be first class citizen, i.e. 
valid syntactical objects in inferential systems. It also underlines what iconic 
representations are good for and what they are not. At first sight, a limited power of 
abstraction and the request of a unique syntactical homomorphism are restrictive, and 
situations to which purely diagrammatic reasoning applies seem limited2. Nevertheless, 
graphical and textual representation systems being complementary (at representational 
and algorithmic levels), the shortcomings of both systems can disappear in HRS. 
Therefore, the preceding review acts as a critique of current approaches to reasoning, 
which tend to emphasize only one mode, diagrammatic or linguistic, and are set up in 
opposition to the other mode (e.g. the mental logic vs. mental models debate). Let us 
now look at an example of hybrid human reasoning in a mastermind game. 
Mastermind3 is well suited to the study of human reasoning, because it constrains 
the player to perform logical reasoning. Furthermore, the geometry of the grid 
encourages the players to use diagrammatic representations. For most players, 
reasoning is fragmented and opportunistic, and consists in partial deductions using 
several types of representations. In [14], we highlighted this hybrid character: most of 
deductions are graphical, while the model under construction partially expresses 
verbally. In fact, the use of graphical representations mitigates limitations in the 
cognitive capacities of the player, anchoring reasoning on inexpensive visual 
capacities, and relieving thus verbal memory. In return, visual capacities being 
themselves restricted, the shape of the diagrams and the ordering of hypotheses are 
biased (this because, even when they express verbally, hypotheses are also grounded on 
the grid). For instance, the left-to-right order (of pins and pawns) and the ease of visual 
translations, influence the choice of hypotheses to be considered first. Nevertheless, 
some players use these biases to develop their own strategy of resolution in an 
intelligent way.  
We have insufficient room here to report all of our observations, but we can 
shortly comment a game of one player (grid on Figure 1). The grid ensures the 
memorizing of preceding results, but, as we will see, it is also a geometrical support for 
organizing proof and backtracking. Our player separates her game in two phases: first 
determining the colors, and then determining the places. In both phases, she uses 
                                                           
2 Contrary to what may seem initially, graphical representations are not only helpful in modeling situations 
where a (concrete) spatial homomorphism applies. 
3 The game consists in discovering a hidden row of five colored pawns. One player (the leader) hides a 
configuration of pawns. The second player can then dispose on a grid a tentative configuration of pawns, and 
the leader replies by posting pins (on the right) indicating if and how pawns correspond to the solution one’s. 
A white pin means a good position and color for one pawn, and a black one a misplaced color. The rows 
remain visible during the game, and the player has to find out the solution with a limited number of rows. 
representations that can be qualified as mental models because they are very similar to 
those of Johnson-Laird [15]. The interesting fact here is that these models (which also 
correspond to LARS of S&O) are ordered both by increasing order of specificity, and 
by decreasing order of probability. This makes backtracking easier, since the model 
considered next is determined, and guarantees a quick convergence to the solution, 







Figure 1. Game of an experienced player 
The player begins on row 1 by her favorite attempt (a 2/2/1 distribution), which 
possible replies revealed being statistically more informative than those of other colors 
distributions (such as 3/2, 4/1, 5, 1/1/3 or 1/1/1/2, etc.). Given the pins on the right side, 
she considers first the interpretation displayed on Figure 2, i.e. that one blue is placed 
correctly, one yellow misplaced, and that there is no red. (She might take in his hand a 





Figure 2. A first interpretation schema 
We note this mental model by [1B] [1Y] (and “no red”) – using square brackets for 
the notion of exhaustion introduced by Johnson-Laird. (Note however that the model 
behind the schema of Figure 2 is more specific, since it includes some information on 
places, but in this first phase of the game, the player does not pay much attention to 
them). Then, she plays the second row, trying new places for blue (anticipation on 
future reasoning about blue places), and introducing a new color: orange. By luck, both 
orange and blue are missing colors, and the interpretation of the second row is obvious. 
Blue being excluded, she switches to a new model based on a new interpretation of the 
first row: [1 Y] 1R.  
Then, she plays the third row both to try new places for red, and to try a new color. 
Getting four pins as a result, she concludes easily that the colors of the solution must be 
yellow, red and green. Given that there is only one yellow, she considers first [1Y] 
[2R] [2G] (which seems more probable than [1Y] [3R] [1G]). She then begins 
reasoning on places and supposes that on the first row, it is the first left yellow that is 
correct (we will note this model by [– – Y – –], knowing that the empty places must 








Figure 3.  A diagrammatic reasoning 
6. R R G Y G  o o o o  o 
5. G R R Y G  o o o    
4. R G R Y G  o o o    
3.  R R R G G  o o o   
2.  O O B B B   
1.  B B Y Y R  o  
1.  B B Y Y R  o    
3. R R R G G  o o o   
2.     
1. B B Y Y R  o   
  
With the diagrammatic reasoning illustrated in Figure 3 (start following the arrows 
from the first row), she infers that on row 3, a red is misplaced, and thus, two greens 
well placed ([– – Y G G]). The solution should be [R R Y G G], but this conflicts with 
the four pins of row 3, which should then be all white. Thus, she has to backtrack and 
reconsider the position of the yellow pawn on the first row ([– – – Y –]). 
A graphic reasoning very similar to the preceding one reveals that in this case, the 
left green is misplaced and the right one correct (i.e. [– – – Y G]). She then tries a 
fourth plausible row, but is this time unlucky. Nevertheless, colors are confirmed and 
she knows by experience that, getting 3 white and 2 black pins means that two pawns 
have just to be exchanged to give the solution. The two pawns to switch are to be found 
in the first three pawns [R G R – –], thus the green must be exchanged with one of the 
two reds. She tries [G R R Y G] on row 5, but is unlucky again. However, there is now 
only one solution for the switch, and she wins on the last row. 
An interesting fact about this game is the use of graphical inferences as those 
depicted on Figure 3. There are other sorts of graphical inferences used by experienced 
players. For instance, by focusing on the common parts of several rows, inferences can 
be draw from the requested mappings between the set of common pins and the set of 
common pawns. All of these inferences are in a way “local” within the global 
reasoning, and they use creative graphic schemas mapped on the fly onto the grid. At a 
higher level, the strategy used by this player consists in a systematic ordering of the 
possibilities opened by a given row. This kind of strategy is often used. At the 
beginning, the reasoning is rooted on the first row, and the most probable model is 
considered first, here with a left-to-right bias in case of equality. For instance, in the 
preceding game, the ordering of the several models compatible with the first row 
(without considering places) is the following:  
[B][Y] no red  < [B] R no yellow < [Y] R no blue.  
The players compare competitive models and their relative probabilities directly from 
the number of pins and pawns. This is why some players have a tendency to prefer 
continuous color arrangements to separate ones, because quantities (or mass) are then 
more salient, and the comparison analogically performed easier. In many cases, the 
player builds a model in easy stages by covering a lattice where models fit into each 
other on a branch (by being more specific). The nature of considered models is not 
always as systematic as in our example, and may vary among players and/or situations. 
Nevertheless, an important fact is that these models layout on the grid in a visual 





Figure 5. Some graphical schemas of interpretation 
However, concerning our player, the global reasoning path is oriented by two 
directions (both grounded on the grid): (1) a left-to-right orientation of the possible 
models within a row, and (2) the natural vertical ordering of the rows. This systematic 
ordering helps remembering which model has to be consider next in case of backtrack. 
This global strategy applies as well in the second phase of the game. Here for instance, 
the ordering on the first row is:  
[– – Y – –] <   [– –  – Y –] <  [– –  –  –  R] 
B B Y Y R o  B B Y Y R o  B B Y Y R o  
The first model [– – Y – –] was quickly eliminated, and [– –  – Y –] evolved 
progressively in a more specific solution.  
Another interesting fact about this example is that diagrammatic representations 
prevent here from incoherence, instead of introducing errors (as many people claimed 
they merely do). Here this is due to the use of limited abstraction diagrams in which 
contradiction is impossible to represent. Furthermore, partially because of the 
specificity property mentioned in the first section, LARS appear to be good candidates 
for ordering models by inclusion. Models may also be orderly among other dimensions, 
by using probabilities or other specific attributes.  
From this point of view, our example can be seen as a prototype for a family of 
programs, where information arises incrementally (here on each new row) and which 
are more or less determining (or approximating) the “solution” – thought of as a matrix 
of values. In such cases, the articulation of local (possibly graphical) subsystems within 
the lattice and the general level controlling flow (in charge of backtracking) is simple, 
because the role of each module is well definite. Each new information may bring 
specific constraints between specific values, and expresses partially in some subsystem, 
but the general program cannot be prepare to all of them. Then, other local heuristics or 
strategies will help and give a core to the general reasoning. 
For instance, this sort of architecture could naturally apply to natural language 
processing, because text appears sequentially, both at discourse level and at sentence 
level. Suppose we have to process some text (i.e. already organized in words, but a 
similar architecture would apply to speech). Each word arrives with new information 
about the “meaning” of a sentence. Such meaning could locally be a matrix of several 
sorts of attributes (which might be values or actions) depending on what the software is 
supposed to do. With current semantics theories, it could be made of linguistic features 
from several domains (morphology, syntax, semantics, etc.). In each domain, there are 
specific constraints that can be handle by modular and more or less independent 
subsystems (for instance, in events semantics, you might have specific representations 
for time, space, causality, etc.). Thus, the general program may used statistics, proper 
strategies (as try to discover syntactical features first) or a left-to-right bias as in our 
mastermind example, to find a way through the several possibilities of filling up the 
mandatory features – without presupposing that some of these features (syntactic ones 
in particular) have to be completely determined first. Particular features may also be let 
undetermined, to keep the natural lack of precision in language. 
3. Perspectives for Hybrid Representation Systems in AGI 
HRS may lead to amazing results concerning efficiency. A paradox is that a given 
demonstration may be limited by a minimal cost in any symbolic system, and still be 
less costly in a hybrid system including and binding the two sorts of representations 
(iconic or symbolic ones). Note that there is nothing sophistic here, because in a hybrid 
system there is no need of a global language to bind its subsystems4 (remind Gödel’s 
proof). Furthermore, the articulation of several subsystems in a complex 
representational system, bases sometimes simply on the fact that they denote the same 
objects in the world, and therefore coherence between two subsystems has not 
                                                           
4 This is why B&E gave a theoretical justification of the two main algorithms implemented in Hyperproof 
[16] based on purely mathematical grounds, without using any intermediate language. 
necessarily to be handle. In the domain of reasoning, the objection that situations in 
which a unique homomorphism applies are rare is as well not too serious, because you 
can use several homomorphisms. The situation is just that the subsystems denote 
different properties of models or objects, and what expresses in one subsystem do not 
express necessarily in the other. Nevertheless, some information can be transfer from 
one system to another (on the basis of safe correspondences), endowing the global 
system with superior inferential and computational capacities. And there is no special 
need of an intermediate language. 
Contrary to what may seem initially, graphical representations are not only helpful 
in modeling situations where a spatial homomorphism applies. Their increased use in 
science is also due to their obvious ability to convey abstract meanings. Via space, they 
bring new possibilities of structuring and abstracting (compared to sequences of letters 
alone). From this point of view, HRS are definitively on top of traditional UARS in the 
hierarchy of S&O. Besides their application to reasoning, their systematic study should 
improve formalization in many domains, which are relevant for AGI, as cognitive 
science, natural language semantics and linguistics. There are many domains in 
semantics where iconic representations seem better suited than logical formalisms. In 
linguistics, the numerous schemas, found in works on time and aspect (for instance 
[17], [18], [19]), are an indication of the plausibility of this thesis. We believe that 
concerning these domains, it is due to the nature of our cognitive apparatus (see next 
subsection). We also believe that the addition of iconic features in theoretical languages 
or tools could bring major advances in other fields of Computer Science, less 
concerned by world representations, as for instance, in the domain of semantics of 
programming languages, or in software design in general. By way of conclusion, we 
add two subsections to reinforce these claims. The following are surely controversial 
proposals. (They are also rather independent and some might be valid, others not.) 
3.1. Outline of a model of the human mind (relation between thought and language) 
To further understanding of the human mind, its higher cognitive capacities, and 
more specifically the nature of the relation between language and thought, the goal is to 
develop a model of language understanding and use that attains observational 
adequacy, i. e. that is able to pass the Turing test. To achieve this goal, we must aim 
higher, by trying to reach explanatory adequacy, that is, to develop a model of how the 
system can reasonably acquire the “knowledge” (i. e., systems of knowledge/belief, 
etc.) that enables it to attain observational adequacy. 
The only way a mind can acquire the rich variety of knowledge humans do acquire 
is to start with a strong innate basis. The only way to build a system with a strong 
innate basis is to organize this basis into modules that are well adapted to representing 
the aspects of the world they represent. This is because of the way the world is (it is 
rich and varied, and the basic conceptual apparatus needed to represent time and 
temporal relations, for instance, must use different resources obeying different 
constraints than that needed to represent spatial relations, or interpersonal relations and 
other minds, or causal interactions, etc). There are probably also general computational 
constraints (problems of tractability and expressive adequacy), and the need for 
revision within relevant constraints (as well as many other factors), which will 
determine the emergence of a set of modules.  
The mind’s rich set of innate modules, its “knowledge” about the world (including 
itself) is thus in the form of representational capacities. While it can be heuristically 
useful to formulate knowledge/beliefs about time, for instance, as a set of axioms (i. e., 
declaratively) it is more plausible to consider that the mind embodies this knowledge as 
a capacity for representation (for instance, for representing temporal entities and 
relations among them). The knowledge is then embedded as constraints on what can be 
represented, and it will be useful to approach the problem of specifying knowledge in a 
certain domain, as the problem of specifying a ‘grammar’ of possible representations in 
that domain (e. g. possible representations of temporal relations among situations — 
precedence, overlapping, inclusion).  
Besides this rich set of domain-specific modules, the mind needs to be equipped 
with a set of procedures for developing and enhancing the innate basis. While some of 
these are no doubt domain-specific, others must be domain-independent. We 
hypothesize that the human mind starts life with an innate basis for domain-specific 
knowledge that is more analogical or diagrammatic in nature, and that one of the 
important ways it develops is in the enrichment of the innate representational capacities 
with more symbolic representational capacities5. 
A mind that has the ability to choose how it will represent a particular problem it 
needs to solve, choosing from a repertoire of representational capacities that include 
more analogical and more symbolic notations is more flexible, hence more “intelligent” 
(more apt to solve its problems, hence to survive). We postulate that humans have this 
kind of mind. To handle this ability to choose between several representational 
capacities, and to keep its repertoire relatively unchanged (after a certain level of 
development), a mind needs also to have generic and global cognitive procedures to 
construct representations on the fly. 
Following the general framework of cognitive approaches to language, we believe 
that linguistic forms are (partial and undetermined) instructions for constructing 
interconnected domains with internal structure. As claimed in [20] by G. Fauconnier, 
this construction takes place at a cognitive level C. This level is distinct from language 
structure. Constructions at level C are not “meanings”, neither representations 
associated with any particular set of linguistic expressions. They are not representations 
of the world, or of models of world, or whatsoever of this sort. However, these 
constructions relate language to real world, and they provide various real-world 
inferences. They also are novel and different for each case of language use, and mental 
spaces and connections build up as discourse unfolds. The primary goal of (and 
primary evidence for) the approach in terms of interconnected domains is scientific 
generalization.  
The first developments of Fauconnier “mental spaces” theory focus on processes 
of transfer from a source (or base) to a target. The capacity of organisms to carry out 
such projections lies at the heart of cognition in its many forms. The analyses given by 
Fauconnier are numerous and based on a rich array of linguistic data (counterfactuals; 
time, tense, and mood; opacity; metaphor; fictive motion; grammatical constructions; 
and quantification over cognitive domains). Further developments of the theory study 
another very interesting operation, conceptual blending [21], which also depends 
centrally on structure projection and dynamic simulation. Like standard analogical 
mapping, blending aligns two partial structures, but in addition, blending projects 
                                                           
5 Similar hypotheses relative to the architecture of mind and compatible with data (in psychology of 
reasoning), conclude to the existence of a meta-representational reflective level (i.e. handling meta-
representation, as thought about thought, and the like) where slow logical inferences are drawn consciously. 
selectively to form a third structure. (Creativity in Science is often based on conceptual 
blending). 
All these works in Cognitive Semantics give us guidelines and examples to 
investigate in details how symbolic and iconic representations might relate in an 
intelligent complex system.  
3.2. Additional remarks from a Computer Scientist point of view 
The problem of the building (and, at first, of the description) of complex program 
architectures on computers is the concern of software engineering. We think that the 
numerous difficulties arising at this level are due to the deficiencies of our 
programming languages, in particular because they do not incorporate a more 
sophisticated level of description of the import features from other modules. Our claim 
is that they do not describe their own architecture (and therefore cannot incorporate 
import features at this level of description). We will not develop this claim here, 
although diagrams are obviously helpful for the description of architectures. We will 
only add a few remarks on iconicity (or on the non arbitrary shape of a symbol), to 
show that this dimension could be helpful at various levels of semantic description. 
A first remark is that a non arbitrary shape character may appear in small touches, 
at the level of an isolated symbol, without even being included in a true iconic system 
(with proper analogical properties). For instance, a simple difference in the character 
font, as the addition of bold face, could modify traditional symbolic representations in a 
creative way. You can keep the old meaning for the new expression (for instance a 
value 0 and a value 0 both refering to zero as usual) and nevertheless have a 
supplementary meaning, relative to another dimension in the modeled world, or in the 
calculation process itself. You can for instance distinguish between a true (and final) 
value, from one that could still change, or be set by default by the system. Or, when 
added to more abstract symbols, as those describing the rewriting rules of a logic 
system, it could introduces second order rewriting rules, allowing to ignore 
intermediate terms (for instance, if not in boldface). Thus, traditional elimination rules 
could apply in a more efficient way (i.e. between distant elements), just by means of an 
additional graphical feature, defined and used at the level of the meta-language itself. 
Our second remark is that, in the context of a computer, the general schema for the 
implementation of the homomorphism between syntactic representations and semantic 
representations do not stand on a simple line, as philosophers and logicians consider. It 
will translate into a program that will calculate, from internal representations (coming 
from our syntactic representations, by an operation of “internalization”), other internal 
representations – which we have to “externalize” if we want to get them explicit. 
Therefore, there are many other means to establish correspondences, or exploiting 
particular diagrammatic features, between all of these representations. In particular, 
some iconic relations may bind the syntax of the programming language used to that of 
the internal representations used, yielding to internally modifiable meaning (IMM). In 
reflective interpreters (cf. lisp), an object interprets as program or data, depending on 
its context of use. In such framework, the traditional data/program distinction vanished 
(as in machine languages). With reflective features, evaluation can be suspended or 
delayed (some functional languages implements lazy evaluation). Some programming 
languages may also have other specificities, as for instance, a pattern-matching 
operation as in PLASMA (an actor language of the eighties). Therefore, on a computer, 
very complex relations between the represented world and the representing world are 
virtually possible. 
Another remark relative to the use of bold (or other such features) is that it can 
obviously be use to handle some notion of focus. Focus theories have not yet been 
successfully design, but it is a lack in our theoretical tools. There are many fields where 
some notion of focus would be of great help (in perception theory, in discourse theory, 
etc.). One reason of this failure might be precisely that the theories of focus require 
references to the underlying computational mechanism (as reflective properties of the 
programming language)v.  
If we take seriously the assumption of endnote IV, i.e., that the meta-language 
required to provide the semantics of a system has to reflect (in some way) the 
possibilities of configurations of terms in the representational language, then we have 
to investigate the following questions: what syntax do we need to easily provide the 
semantics of HRS? Would it be enough to add simple reflective and local graphical 
feature (as those of some of our programming languages) to a traditional functional and 
symbolic language, or should this syntax be trickier? 
Conclusion 
Works done so far on diagrammatic reasoning provide fragments of evidence about 
how people use iconic representations, and identify some of the problems raised by the 
project of AGI. Yet, there is still much to do to understand the variety of forms in 
which information can stored and manipulated in intelligent control systems. We 
believe that we could make important progress in studying in details the relation 
between iconic and symbolic features in hybrid representation systems, as well as in 
paying attention to them in the theoretical tools and symbolic languages that we use.  
Endnotes 
 
i However, contrary to what many authors have said, it is not difficult to represent disjunctive cases on 
diagrams, and we will see some exemplars in the next section (see Figure 5). It is also possible to have iconic 
symbols of second order in purely diagrammatic systems. C.S. Peirce first suggested to represent disjunctions 
in the form of a line connecting two iconic symbols. But in a formal system, the introduction of such symbols 
requires the definition of transformation rules on diagrams.  
ii The analogical/digital distinction also relies on a notion of specificity for Dretske [11]. For him, every 
signal transmitting information necessarily carries this information under two aspects: an analogical form and 
a digital form. The analogical form always contains an additional specificity relative to the information 
properly conveyed by the digital form. 
iii The omnipresence of representation of the same type designating the same object is thus observed in 
human language, where references to an object can be spread out everywhere in a document, so that 
information is not « localized » (quoted from [13]). For P&M, this additional character is the one required to 
give diagrammatic systems the closure under constraints property, when combined with iconicity and a 
constraint and systematic homomorphism. 
iv
 Let us take the example of Ann, Gaston, and Isabel, who are represented as « ordered » in the 
diagrammatic case. A minimal difference, but an essential one, between the two types of representations is 
the following: 
 (I)   left-of (a, g) & left-of (g, i)   
and (II)  ordered ([ a, g, i])  (or just [a, g, i] ) 
 
 
There is an additional syntactical complexity for (II) which prevents its meaning, contrary to that of (I), 
from being described as a function of one argument of its predicate's meaning. Indeed, you can easily assign 
a meaning to the semantic equation: [[ left-of ( a , g) ]] = [[ left-of]] ([[ a ]] , [[ g ]] ), while you cannot write anything 
else but: [[ ordered ([a, g, i]) ]]  =  [[ ordered ]]  ( [[  [a, g, i] ]]  ), which implies giving meaning, at the meta-
language level, to a configuration of terms (the list figuring between simple square brackets). Therefore, the 
semantic descriptive meta-language must offer possibilities of syntactical structuring of data similar to the 
ones figuring in the representation language, because it will sometimes be necessary to assign them a 
meaning. This is not to say that all syntactical nuances of the representational system must reflected in the 
interpretation system, because not all iconic representation features are interpreted in a diagrammatic 
representation (think to the use of marked features in mathematical figure to derive geometrical proofs). 
Nevertheless, it shows that semantic compositionality relies on syntactic considerations. 
v Note that in the context of graphical interfaces, several notion of focus are required at a very low 
level (in the graphic server itself), in order to link the keyboard (and/or events on the pointer of the mouse) to 
a particular window. The development of graphical interfaces (and networks) has introduced considerable 
changes in the previous programming framework. (1) There are other sources of input than letters (at least, 
mouse inputs), and other sorts of output (graphics, sound). (2) The input/output data are of distinct nature, but 
they may be link together in the system (as the mouse and the screen). (3) The sharing of input/output devices 
by several programs adds some additional complexity to the emerging framework. 
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